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Abstract 
Objective – An empirical investigation to assess the impact of bank-affiliated business 
group on firm’s capital structure decisions.  
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 146 group affiliated firms and subsamples 
for bank and non-bank affiliated firms was analyzed with random-effect panel regression 
model to determine the relationship of bank-affiliated business group on firm’s capital 
structure determinants of listed firms in Pakistan using data for 2006-2011. 
Findings – We have found that bank affiliated firms financing decisions are significantly 
different from that of non-bank affiliated firms with a common factor of internal capital 
market.  Bank affiliated firm capital structure determinants of growth, asset tangibility, 
non-debt tax shield and operating risk show significantly different association with 
choice of leverage compared to non-bank affiliated firms.  
Policy implications – Our results show that group affiliated firms particularly bank 
affiliated firms are the reason of market imperfections and have successfully eliminated 
the market distortions keeping others on a disadvantage.  Hence, Policy makers are 
suggested to improve the regulatory system and its implementation. 
Originality/value – According to best of our knowledge this is the first study to extend 
the literature of firm financing decisions in relation to bank-group affiliation in Pakistan.  
Keywords  
Capital Structure, Bank Affiliation, Business Groups and Panel Regression  
Introduction 
Firm financing decision is key element to achieve the ultimate objective of corporate 
wealth maximization.  Managers normally decide about the financing choice based upon 
the firm’s internal financial capability, external environment and financial market 
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accessibility.  There is an important role and impact of regulatory framework on the firm 
inclination to debt or equity.  Phenomenon of business group having internal ownership 
ties, concentrated financial and managerial control exists in emerging economy of 
Pakistan (Gohar, 2013).  Business group formulation is achieved to attain efficient access 
to the capital market, scarce information and realize market control through diversified 
business portfolio (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001).  These business groups subsidize their sister 
concerns through intra-group fund transfers, internal party transactions, asset acquisition 
and help each other to guarantee against loans, stimulating an internal capital market 
(Zhang & Huang, 2013).  Furthermore, business groups affect the economic, regulatory, 
market and corporate environment which are crucial contributors of firm capital structure 
decision.  According to social structure and political economy approach large business 
groups are able to influence the policy makers, regulators and politicians to gain 
contractual, financial and information benefits.  Concisely, concentrated group ownership 
is strategized to decrease the effect of market distortions, resource diversion and create 
market imperfections keeping others on a disadvantage of resource disparity.  Such firm 
specific environment, strategy and presence of internal capital market are observed to 
affect the capital structure determinants and financing choice (Leff, 1978). 
Bank is an integral part of financial market as a financial intermediary with a prime 
responsibility to inject the public savings into economy.  Involvement of bank and group 
affiliation leads to the preference of private interests over the economic and public 
interests demonstrating financial control and privilege of its utilization in same hands 
(Deb, 2010).    Some of the groups in Pakistan are affiliated with banks and vice versa by 
their ownership patterns.  Such relationship amongst borrowing and lending firms is 
supposed to have serious implications for both parties (Freixas & Rotchet, 1997).  In 
addition to cross subsidization and internal capital market in non-bank affiliated business 
groups, bank affiliated business group firms under the same pyramidal ownership with 
shared objectives may enjoy direct and readily access to debt market, low cost of 
financing, reduced information asymmetries, agency conflicts and financial distress. At 
the same time lesser monitoring cost and access to valuable information may increase the 
bank involvement and its significance comparative to non-bank affiliated firms. 
According to Claessens, Fan and Lang (2006) concentrated group ownership leads to 
greater (minority and majority shareholders) agency cost, resource diversion and dilution 
of minority rights leading to concentration of wealth.  All these group level factors and 
bank affiliation of business groups are important determinants of firm’s financing 
decision. Such relationship is in conflict with the standard banking practices and thus 
creates market impurities, resource inefficiences and issues of governance (Deb, 2010).  
Group affiliation and exposure of ownership is not likely and is restricted in different 
countries of the world like; Steagall Act 1933 of US regulations.  Likewise, India does 
not allow more than 10% bank equity holding by non-financial firm.  Pakistan is 
characterized by the weak corporate regulatory system where fund and non-fund based 
exposure of commercial bank in non-financial firms and business group is limited up to 
50% (State Bank of Pakistan, 2009).  
Business group and bank affiliation under the same ownership in presence of weak 
regulatory environment may seriously affect the capital structure dynamics of bank 
affiliated group firms.  This study is an empirical investigation to assess the effect of 
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bank and business group affiliated firms on their capital structure determinants 
comparative to non-bank affiliated group firms.   
Earlier studies are only based upon group affiliated business firms.  This study 
seggregates the group affiliated firms into two subsamples of non-bank and bank 
affiliated business firms.  As per best of our knowledge this the first study to see the 
capital structure dynamics of group affiliated firms specifically in relation to bank 
ownership in Pakistan.   
 The paper is further organized to have literature review and hypothesis development in 
upcomming section; third part consists of data and methodology; fourth part presents 
results and discussion and conclusion, implicaions, limitations and future research 
dimensions are covered in the last section. 
Literature Review 
Three major theories of capital structure including pecking order theory, agency theory 
and the tradeoff theory are widely tested involving variants of models in Pakistan.  
Empirical studies regarding financing decisions of Pakistani firms confirm the support of 
trade off and pecking order theories (Afza & Hussain, 2011; Sheikh & Wang, 2011; 
Qureshi & Azid, 2006; Booth et al. 2001).    
Business groups subsidize their sister concerns by intra-group fund and profit transfers as 
well as with the internal party transactions, guarantees against loans and asset acquisition.  
According to Gohar (2013) business groups in Pakistan have higher level of liquidity and 
leverage comparative to non-group affiliated firms, and found evidence supporting the 
presence of cross-subsidization or tunneling effect amongst business groups.  Similarly, 
studies by Chang and Hong (2000); Zhang and Huang (2013) and He et al. (2013) have 
found evidence regarding internal party transactions and loan guarantee in group 
affiliated business firms.  However, extensive reallocation of funds and use of profitable 
firms as cash cows is evidenced in bank-led groups of Russia (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001).  
So, bank affiliated firms are supposed to have greater level of related party transactions 
and incremental effect of cross subsidization directly affecting the capital structure of 
affiliated firms.   
According to Leff (1976) countries charachterized by weak regulatory system have 
greater market imperfections and group affiliations could decrease the market 
imperfections and improve the firm performance. Modeling the information and market 
imperfection problems and its effect on group firm’s leverage (Manos, Murinde, & 
Green, 2007)Manos, Murinde, and Green (2007) observed significantly different decision 
criteria’s supporting the internal capital market argument with higher degree of access to 
financial markets. 
According to theoretical literature firms level of leverage in relation to ownership 
concentration is decided upon growth opportunities, monitoring cost, risk of bankruptcy 
and to avoid hostile takeover.  The study of Stulz (1988) supported the argument given 
the level of equity investment.  Similarly, Canadian group businesses have higher debt 
ratios than of non-affiliated firms (King & Santor, 2008). Group affiliated firms may 
remove information asymmetries, improved access to debt market justifying higher level 
of leverage (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Dewenter & Warther, 1998).  Higher level debt 
by bank affiliated firms is justified from signalling theory of capital sturcture as 
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pessimistic investors consider increasing debt as favourable sign for future progress 
(Ross, 1977).   Conclusively, higher level of debt and lessor monitoring cost and access 
to valuable information increase the bank involvement and its significance comparative 
to non-bank affiliated firms.   
According to agency theory, conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is an 
important determinant of firm source of financing.  Depending upon the level of control 
and managerial capability studies regarding group or family control states that it may or 
may not mitigate agency conflict (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2001).  However, In case of bank and business group affiliation common stake serving by 
bank and its affiliated firms reduce the friction of agency conflict (Gul, 1999).  
Seemingly, because of presence of bank intermediation and mitigated agency conflict 
firm could be at a point of indifference between the choice of debt and equity.   
Secondly, the conflict of interest between minority and majority shareholders is of vital 
consideration in group affiliated firms.  Pyramidal control may lead to higher agency 
problems by diverting value from minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2006). 
Likewise, Ciamarra (2012) suggested that presence of bank in ownership stakes increase 
the level of debt, resource misappropriation and decrease the debt level sensitivity, cost 
of borrowing and debt covenents.  
According to political economy theory benefit associated to taxibility of debt and trade 
off-theory of capital structure becomes irrelevant when business groups gains political 
affiliations and benefits (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998).  Futhermore, policy distortion 
theory explains the ability of business groups to influence the policy makers (Ghemawat 
& Khanna, 1998). The similar evidence are observed by (Ghani, Haroon, & Ashraf, 
2011).   
Futhermore, Shyu (2013) states that overall group characteristics are important in capital 
structure decisions than of non-affiliated firms.  Overall characheristics includes the 
diversification strategy and its affiliation with financial institutions. Complex group 
enviornment composed of diversified business portfolios particularly direct relationship 
with financial institutions is partially explained by the existing capital structure theories 
(Margaritis, 2010).  The reduced information aysmmetries, increased access to external 
capital market by accessing the policy makers and internal capital market has serious 
implications for pecking order theory of capital strurcture.  Secondly, trade-off theory 
loose its importance because of alternative tax shield through internal party transactions 
and utilization of plitical influence (Manos, 2007).  Third main theory regarding agency 
conflict also have serious implications because of common stake serving by both 
debtholder and major shareholder or because of concentrated financial and mangerial 
ownership (Gul, 1999).   
Above discussion implies that group affiliation in general have implications on existing 
capital structure theories.  Bank affiliated firms having readily and direct access to debt 
market with common objectives in presence of weak regulatory system also have further 
implication for traditional theories of capital sturcture.  However, Earlier studies are only 
based upon group affiliated business firms.  This study seggregates the group affiliated 
firms into two subsamples of non-bank and bank affiliated business firms.   
Firm specific determinants of capital structure and hypothesis 
development   
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Table 1- Brief comparison of capital structure determinants and their relation to firm 
leverage 
Variables Theoratical 
relation 
Empirical 
relation 
Expected sign 
for bank 
affiliated firms 
Theories and proxy 
indicators 
Liquidity − − − Agency theory: agency 
cost of debt, Trade-off 
theory; financial distress 
and business risk 
Profitability − − − Trade-off theory. Pecking 
order theory; bankruptcy 
costs 
Growth 
Opportunitiy 
−/+ − − Agency theory: agency 
cost of debt.  Trade-off 
theory: financial distress / 
Signalling theory: Pecking 
order theory 
Firm size +/− − − Agency theory: agency 
cost of debt. Trade off 
theory: bankruptcy costs 
and tax. / Information 
asymmetry Other theories: 
Political Economy theory 
and Policy distrotion 
theory 
Tangibility + + − Trade-off theory: financial 
distress and business risk.  
Agecny theory: agency 
cost of debt 
Non-debt 
tax shield 
− − + Trade off theory: tax Other 
theories: Political 
Economy theory, Policy 
distrotion theory and 
theory of social structure 
Operating 
Risk/Earnin
g Volatility 
−/+ − + Trade-off theory: financial 
distress / Agency theory 
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Firm leverage has been an extensive area of empirical investigation beginning from the 
seminal work of (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  Subsequenly, studies have been conducted 
on extensive level giving birth to static trade-off, information asymmetry, pecking order, 
signalling, agency cost, free cash flow, dynamic trade-off and market timing theories of 
firms capital structure (Ahmadinia, Afrasiabishani, & Hesami, 2012).  According to 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991) measure of leverage is of significant importance from 
interpretation of response and determinant point of view.  We are using market based 
measure of debt to equity to incorporate the effect of firm value against the value of debt 
as used by (Zhang, 2013).  Table 1 elebaborates the theories of capital sturcture and their 
expected theoratical and mostly reported empirical relation with firm leverage as 
provided by (Deesomasak, Paudyal, & Pescetto, 2004).  
According to agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) liquidity motivates managers 
to overlook the ultimate firm goals giving a rise to an agency conflict amongst 
shareholders and debtholders.  Whereas, pecking order theory propose that firms with 
higher liquid assets tend to rely more on their internal resources and are less inclined 
towards borrowing (Booth et al. 2001).  Table 1 reports the theoratical and empirically 
varified negative relation of liquidity and leverage.  Bank affiliations are considered to 
reduce liquidity constraints, the level of agency conflict and financial distress, postulating 
less dependence on liquidity and negative relationship with firm leverage.  
Regarding firm size Harris (1991) states that larger firms tend to have higher debts 
because of their lower bankruptcy risk, lower monitoring cost and to avail tax benefit.  
Whereas, greater information asymmetries affect firm financing decision adversly (Baert, 
2009). The postulated positive relationship amongst bank affiliated firms is supposed to 
be of lesser importance because of internal affiliation with the lender and lower cost of 
information collection, easy access to debt market and direct monitoring by the bank.  On 
the other hand, group affiliated firms have centralized ownership pattern postulating firm 
size to be negatively associated with leverage.     
In case of higher growth opportunities higher agency cost lead firms to use internal 
resources or equity than of debt financing (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  According to 
Myers and Majluf (1984) firms pursuing growth objectives are tend to have higher 
amount of debt as a positive signal to investors.  Later, Kester (1986) confirmed the 
findings of signalling effect in association with lending and industry group compositions.  
In case of bank affiliated growing firm seem to be indifferent reasoned by the presence of 
centrally controlled ownership of both equity and debtholder or interlocking directorships 
(Gul, 1999).  For bank affiliated firms we postulate a negative relationship amongst 
growth and leverage. 
Tangibility is reported to have positive relationship with leverage (He et al., 2013).  In 
case of group affiliated firm higher tangibility allow firms to guarantee each other for 
possible acquisition of debt (Zhang & Huang, 2013).  Higher liquidation value is 
considered to be collateral for secured debts from lenders point of view (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988).  In presence of strong bank affiliation collateral value of firm tangible 
assets may not play a significant role to acquire debt financing. In case of bank affiliated 
group firms we postulate negative association between tangibility and firm choice of 
leverage based upon the argument of internal capital market to avoid greater bankruptcy 
risk. 
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According to Table 1 Profitablity is hypothesised to have negative relationship with 
leverage as per earlier theoratical and empirical studies (Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
Pecking order theory argues that higher profits are the reasons of negative debt 
requirements as firms tend to use their internally generated funds first and then move for 
outsider financing.  Recent studies of       Booth et al. (2001); Margaritis and Psillaki 
(2010) confirmed the earlier findings.  However, group affiliations may be characterized 
by the element of misappropriation of wealth and conflict amongs majority and minority 
shareholders.  Bank affiliated firms are postulated to respond in the same manner.  
Non-Debt Tax Shield (NDTS) according to the trade off theory is predicted to have 
negative association with leverage.  Tax benefit associated with debt decrease the cost of 
financing and depriciation and amortization place an incremental motivation to decrease 
the cost of financing (Manos et al., 2007).  On the other hand, Bradley et al. (1984) has 
explore positive relationship with firm debt taking ability.   Bank affiliated firms may not 
be more concerned about the cost of debt because of their internal ties with financial 
institutes and institutional factors of social structure and political economy approach 
(Gul, 1999).  Consequently, we can postulate that such relationship keep the firm on a 
level of indifference to avail the benefit as substitute of debt based tax shield. 
Operating risk or volatility is a financial distress indicator expected to negatively affect 
the firms financing choice of debt.  Higher level of debt has its imbeded probability of 
financial uncertainty and increases the cost of bankruptcy (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Consequently, higher volatility of earnings inversly affect the firms debt taking ability 
and decrease the chances to meet the maturing debt commitments. The earlier evidences 
reveal that firms with higher earning volatility may be supported and subsidized by the 
group associated firms (Zhang & Huang, 2013).  Such a conglomerate of non-financial 
firms and financial banks would not affect the firm capital structure choices keeping 
indifferent with increasing or decreaing earning volatility. Consequently, we postulate 
that bank affiliated firm financing decisions might not take such negative effect of 
volatility in presence of  internal debt market, cross subsidization, market imperfection 
and concentrated control.   
Data and Methodology  
We seek to determine the effect of bank and business group affiliation and its effect on 
the capital structure determinants.  The data for this study is obtained primarily from a 
publicly available database maintained by Securities & Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP), Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and SBP, regarding financials of KSE 
listed firms from 2006 to 2001 for Pakistani listed firms.  Our sample consists of 146 
group affiliated companies which is further divided into two subsamples.  First 
subsample consists of 92 non-bank affiliated group firms which are obtained from earlier 
research and confirmed from their respective group websites.  Second subsample consists 
of 54 bank affiliated group firms, manually obtained and confirmed from their group 
websites and the book “Who Owns Pakistan”.  According to our study there are 9 bank 
affiliated business groups in Pakistan.  Only non-financial affiliated firms are part of our 
sample.  Mudaraba company affiliated groups are not the part of our bank-affiliated 
firms.  
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Variables  Definition 
DeE (Dependent) Leverage: Total liabilities/market value of equity 
LnTA Size: Natural logarithm of the total assets  
ProF Profitability: EBIT/total assets 
OpeR Operating Leverage or SD of EBIT/total Assets 
GrO Growth Opportunity: Annual growth rate of the total assets 
LiQ Liquidity: Current Ratio 
TanG Tangibility: Net fixed Assets to Total Assets 
NDTS Non-Debt Tax Shield: Depreciation and Amortization /Total 
Assets 
BaG Bank Affiliation: Dummy 1 for bank-affiliated and 0 for non-bank 
affiliated business group 
 
Our sample size represent 82% of the overall group affiliated firms of Pakistan.  Group 
bank affiliation is measured and defined based on pyramidal ownership structure, cross 
directorship confirmed manually from their annual reports.  We have used a dummy of 1 
for bank affiliated groups and 0 for non-bank affiliated group firms.  The following firm 
specific characteristics are used to proxy the capital sturcture determinants.   According 
to nature of data (longitudinal data set) consisting of a list of companies for set of year 
based observations panel data regression analysis is most suitable.  Panel regression is 
divided into two parts fixed and random effect regression models.  According to 
Hausman Specification Test value of (chi-sq = 871.64) we accept our null hypothesis 
claiming that random effect exists and have determined the random effect panel data 
regression model appropriately measuring our data characteristics.  Our econometric 
model is based upon panel data random effect GLS regression model used to test the 
capital structure dynamics, of bank and non-bank affiliated business groups.   
Our panel data random effect regression Model is: 
DeE= β0 + β1(LnTA) + β2(ProF) + β3(TanG) + β4(GrO) + β5(NDTS) + β6(LiQ) + 
β7(OpeR) +    β8(BaG) + αi 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics which mainly accounts for values of mean and 
standard deviation of dependent variable DeE and independent variables LnTA, TanG, 
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ProF, GrO, OpeR and LiQ for overall group affiliated, non-bank affiliated and non-bank 
affiliated firms in Tire I, II and III respectively.  Our statistical analysis show mean value 
of debt to equity 1.68 for bank affiliated group firms comparative to 1.71 and 1.78 for 
non-bank and overall affiliated firms.  Log value of total assets proxied for firm size 
shows a diverse size of firms from the mean value of 14.816m ranging from minimum to 
maximum value. The results show even stronger assessment on the basis of maximum 
value comparison of our subsamples.  
Table 2- Descriptive Statistics 
Tire I Overall Group Affiliated Firms 
Variables  Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis  Observations 
DeE 1.711 1.680 79.280 -76.820 5.733 -1.528 94.006 874 
LiQ 1.317 0.970 15.360 -0.287 1.478 4.529 29.199 874 
LnTA 14.816 14.816 19.025 3.664 1.660 -1.516 13.239 874 
GrO 139.437 117.513 1031.100 0.029 85.454 4.718 38.894 874 
TanG 48.687 49.215 97.151 1.760 21.513 -0.107 2.502 874 
NDTS 3.358 3.071 54.648 0.943 2.711 9.570 163.376 874 
OpeR 5.652 3.197 92.468 0.243 7.987 5.529 51.172 874 
ProF 34.348 2.544 780.400 -412.821 941.662 29.478 870.635 874 
Tire II Bank Affiliated Group Firms 
Variables  Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Mean Comparison 
t-statistic  Observations 
DeE 1.681 1.630 28.080 -52.800 4.890 
 
-0.190* 324 
LiQ 1.478 0.895 15.360 0.040 1.900 
 
-3.031 324 
LnTA 15.033 14.908 18.023 12.429 1.388 
 
-3.580 324 
GrO 128.694 115.213 427.075 29.401 55.274 
 
-1.668 324 
TanG 48.672 48.130 95.848 1.760 19.461 
 
3.928 324 
NDTS 3.500 3.240 24.606 0.943 2.042 
 
0.718* 324 
OpeR 5.586 3.233 81.160 0.429 8.096 
 
-0.810* 324 
ProF 2.905 1.539 108.163 -50.597 13.757 
 
0.956* 324 
Tire III Non-Bank Affiliated Group Firms 
Variables  Mean 
 
Median 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Mean Comparison 
t-statistic  Observations 
DeE 1.729 1.680 79.280 -76.820 6.181 -0.190* 550 
LiQ 1.221 0.990 10.550 -0.287 1.150 -3.031 550 
LnTA 14.688 14.789 19.025 3.664 1.790 -3.580 550 
GrO 145.766 119.779 1031.100 0.029 98.521 -1.668 550 
TanG 48.696 49.693 97.151 4.356 22.652 3.928 550 
NDTS 3.275 2.921 54.648 0.969 3.035 0.718* 550 
OpeR 5.691 3.102 92.468 0.243 7.930 -0.810* 550 
ProF 52.871 2.873 780.400 -412.821 187.014 0.956* 550 
*Mean comparison of bank and non-bank affiliated firms are  not equal at 95% confidence interval 
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We can observe that bank affiliated firms use lower amount of debt as compared to non-
bank affiliated firms.  Bank affiliated groups show higher level of liquidity, growth 
opportunities and size but lower level of profits than of all other group affiliated firms.  
However, growth, profitability, and tangibility show higher level deviation from mean 
values across all samples. According to mean comparison of bank and non-bank affiliated 
firms t-statistics, DeE, NDTS, OpeR and ProF are having significantly differenct mean 
values.  Drawing from our statistical analysis we have found that bank affiliated firms use 
less amount of debt comparative to non-bank affiliated firms with higher level of 
liquidity indicating lower liquidity problem and financial distress.  However, significantly 
different level of mean value of profitability of bank and non-bank affiliated firms may 
be explained by the argument of misappropriation of wealth amongst majority over 
minority shareholders.  However, bank affiliated firms confrunt lower amount of earning 
volatility comparative to non-bank affiliated firms indciating lower cost of bankruptcy.  
Conclusively, our descriptive statistical analysis signifies the study of bank and non-
affiliated firms seperately for the firms capital structure determinants. 
Regression Results and Discussion 
Analysis is divided in three parts based on our sample of overall group affiliated and sub 
samples of non-bank affiliated and bank affiliated firms.  Table II presents cross sectional 
panal data analysis consisting parameter estimates(test statistics) showing significant but 
inconsistent results across subsamples of non-bank and bank affiliated business groups.  
F-statistics demonstrates significantly good fittness of panel data random effect 
regression models.  As per column 3 our t-statistics of (2.20) demonstrate that bank 
affiliation is significantly related with the firm’s choice of financing.   Internal 
association, centrally controlled and cross ownership thus have significant affect on the 
firms capital structure determination decisions and motivate to keep lower level of debt 
comparative to equity financing.   
From agency theory point of view higher level of debt restrains the managerial discretion 
and help to mitigate the agency conflict.  Furthermore, joint ownership of banks and non-
banking institutions affects the role of  bank intermediation comparative to stand alone 
banks leading to market imperfection positively affecting its affiliated firms.  Affiliated 
banks would have direct control, less information cost with an added advantage of direct 
financial market access for the affiliated firms. 
Liquidity exhibits consistent results over all subsample with the postulated negative 
association with firm choice of debt financing.  As per pecking order theory firms with 
higher level of liquidity first employ their internal resources to restrict managerial 
discretion.  As per coefficient statistics (-0.668) bank affiliated group firms are evident to 
be less dependent on liquidity level as of other subsamples.  Ownership interlocking and 
relationship with bank are not neglectable factors to understand our results.  Thus, 
regression results provide clear support to our postulation that bank affiliated firms have 
less dependence on level of liquidity. 
As observed from Table 3, column 1 and 2 overall and non-bank affiliated firms have 
tendency to increase their level of debt with the increase in growth opportunities.  
Column 3 shows negative and highly statistically significant association of between 
growth and firm choice of debt.  In accordance to agency theory our results show that 
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bank affiliated firms have lesser cost of debt.  The argument of lower financial distress 
compared to non-bank affiliated group firms is justifable in light of trade-off theory of 
capital structure.  So hypothesis of bank affiliated growing firm seems to be indifferent 
reasoned by the presence of centrally controlled ownership of both equity and debtholder 
or interlocking directorships is falsified.  However, our results are in accordance with the 
trade-off theory.   
Firm size show consistent negative and highly significant relationship with leverage 
across overall and subsamples.  Contrary to others bank affiliated firms show lower (-
0.1176) dependence on size in choice of capital structure. 
Table 3- Random Effect Panel Data Analysis 
Variables 
Overall 
1 
Non-Bank 
Affiliated Groups 
2 
Bank Affiliated Groups 
3 
Bank Affiliated - - 2.590582*** 
 
- - (2.76) 
Liquidity 
-0. 
4306*** -1. 4488*** -0.66812*** 
 
(-18.18) (-24.36) (-24.99) 
Size 
-0. 
3170*** -0. 39016*** -0.11759*** 
 
(-2.82) (-3.07) (-3.2) 
Growth 
0. 
1708*** 0. 12756*** -0. 45871*** 
 
(4.05) (2.7) (-4.99) 
Tangibility 0. 0084 -0. 35871** -0. 0159 
 
(0.04) (-1.57) (-0.06) 
Tax Shield 0. 6204 -0. 2741 0. 68097 
 
(0.55) (-0.86) (0.27) 
Operating Risk 
0. 
1185*** -0. 47568 0.61334*** 
 
(3.90) (-0.78) (4.58) 
Profitability 
-0. 
0943*** -0.12010*** -0.16500*** 
 
(-4.88) (-7.33) (-9.67) 
Constant 
3. 
7174*** 4. 5653*** 4.76195*** 
 
(5.47) (9.48) (8.17) 
R-sq 0.5378*** 0.5144*** 0.4879*** 
Chi-Sq 407.98 
 
379.27 
*Significant at 10% level    **Significant at 5% level   ***Significant at 1% level 
 
Moreover, the negative coefficient sign  could possibly be explained based by the 
argument that larger firm size with bank affiliation decrease the cost of information and 
bankruptcy.  Our descriptive analysis bank affiliated firms are larger in size compared to 
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non-bank affiliated firms. Furthermore, according to policy distortion theory its is also 
argued that large firms have the ability to influence the policy makers (Gul, 1999).    So, 
we can say that large bank affiliated firms show reduced information asymmetries and 
lower cost of bankruptcy having direct association with lending institute.  
Presented in column 2 of table 3 non-bank affiliated firms are observed to have higher 
and significant dependence on the tangibility.  According to both agency and trade-off 
theory of capital structure firms level of leverage increase with the level of asset 
tangibility. But the negative and significant relationship is observed for non-bank 
affiliated group firms supporting the presence of internal fund transfers and corss 
subsidization.  However, bank affiliated firms show negative and insignificant 
dependence of capital structure on firm asset tangibility.  Such relationship depicts that 
bank affiliated firm financing decision does not depend upon the asset tangibility.   
Accepting our hypothesis that bank affiliated firms capital structure choice seem to be 
indifferent with the level of tangible assets because of multiple effects of industry group 
relations and lending group association.  Our results signifies that firm leverage decision 
is not affected by the level of tangible assets in presence of bank affiliation but are 
important for non-bank affiliated business groups. 
Group affiliated firms financing choice is observed to have insignificant relationship with 
non-debt tax shield.  Non-bank affiliated group firms demonstrate -0.2741(-0.86) 
negative and theoretically justified relationship.  On the other hand, bank affiliated firms 
show positive and insignificant 0.680(.27) relationship between tax shield and leverage.  
According to political economy theory large group firms can access the political 
authorities to gain certain benefits.  So, in light of political economy theory and our test 
statistics  bank affiliated group firms seem to be less concerned about utilization of tax 
benefits from depreciation and amortization.  Based on above grounds we accept our 
hypothesis that bank affiliated firm leverage decision is not affected based upon the non-
debt tax shield. 
Firms with higher earning volatility have higher operating risk preventing firm to take 
further debt.  However, according to agency theory higher level of debt may mitigate the 
cost of agency between shareholders and mangers.  Our findings regarding non-bank 
affiliated firms show negative but insignificant relationship between operating risk and 
leverage having higher level of debt than of bank affiliated group firms.  .  However, non-
bank affiliated firms insignificance to earning volatility and leverage decision is an 
indication of cross-subsidization.  On the contrary, bank affiliated firms have 
significantly different situation based on estimated value of 0.6809(4.58) showing highly 
significant and positive relationship.  Such relationship depicts that bank affiliated firm 
financing decision is affected by financial distress but the retained level of debt is there to 
mitigate the agency conflict.  Furthermore, in particular senerio of bank affiliated firms 
concentrated ownership and common stake serving justify the positively significant 
relationship of operating risk and choice of leverage according to agency theory.  So, for 
bank affiliated firms we accept our hypothesis that earning volatility is positively 
associated with firm leverage.    
Profitable firms are considered to use internal funds avoiding higher levels of debt having 
a firewall againt the potential cost of bankruptcy.  According to our descriptive statistics 
bank affiliated firms show lower level of profitability compared to non-bank affiliated 
firms.  Whereas, our regression results show highly significant relationship between firm 
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profitablity and leverage across all subsamples.  In particular case of bank affiliated firms 
lower level of profits with highly significant association with debt reveals that 
concentrated control and reallocation of funds keep minorities on a disadvantage.  Such 
situation favors our argument that bank affiliated firms are charachterized by resource 
misappropriation, giving rise to conflict of interest between major and minority 
shareholders.  
Multiple Regression Analysis 
To analyse the association of our proxied variable for bank affiliation (BaG), amongst 
leverage and  capital structure determinants, we have regressed independent variables 
individually and jointly.  Table 3 demonstrate nine regression models to assess the joint 
association of bank affiliation and liquidity, size, growth, tangibility, tax shield and 
operating risk on uni-veriate basis.  Our results reveal that group-bank affiliation is 
positively and statistically associated with the firm leverage.  According to value of 
calculated test statistics growth, size and profitability are not significantly related with 
leverage regressed in combination of group-bank affiliation.  So, our earlier results are 
confirmed regarding the association of bank for the firm capital structure determinants. 
Table 4- Significance of Bank Affiliation and Individual Predictor with Leverage 
Multiple Regression  Analysis 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Bank Affiliated 1.1269*** 1.5424*** 2.7442*** 1.2488*** 0.7865*** 0.7747*** 1.0562*** 1.0833*** 2.5905*** 
 
(8.29) (14.97) (2.37) (7.45) (3.84) (5.09) (7.64) (7.77) (2.76) 
Liquidity 
 
-0.2810*** 
      
-
0.3208*** 
  
(-11.52) 
      
(-12.77) 
Size 
  
-0.1075* 
     
-0.06588 
   
(-1.4) 
     
(-1.04) 
Growth 
   
-0.0009* 
    
-
0.00167** 
    
(-1.2) 
    
(-1.87) 
Tangibility 
    
0.0070** 
   
0.0040* 
     
(2.18) 
   
(1.32) 
Tax Sheild 
     
0.1005*** 
  
0.0734*** 
      
(4.96) 
  
(3.34) 
Operating Risk 
      
0.0702*** 
 
0.1151*** 
       
(2.91) 
 
(4.34) 
Profitability 
       
0.0153 
-
0.02693** 
        
(1.07) (-1.76) 
Constant 1.200898 2.30294 0.204432 0.757916 1.274178 1.309626 1.248911 1.490125 3.589787 
 
(22.25)*** (9.98)*** (0.3) (5.63)*** (7.39)*** (10.35)*** (10.27)*** (11.85)*** (5.8)*** 
          
Chi-Sq 68.68 0.3331 71.24 73 76.56 94.68 77 72.44 379.27 
R-Sq 0 269.05 0.0129 0.0516 0.0526 0.0244 0.0075 0.0516 0.4879 
*Significant at 10% level   **Significant at 5% level  ***Significant at 1% level 
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Conclusion 
Motivated by integration of bank intermediation role and business group affiliated firm 
dynamics we seek to determine the effect of such relationship on the firm’s financing 
decisions.  As per the best of our knowledge this is the pioneer empirical investigation in 
Pakistan to extend the literature of capital structure in this dimension.  Random effect 
panel regression is used on the manually extracted data set of listed bank and non-bank 
affiliated firms of Pakistan for the year 2006-2011.  We have found that bank affiliated 
firms financing decisions are significantly different from that of non-bank affiliated firms 
with a common factor of internal capital market.  Moreover, bank affiliated firms are 
larger in size, having lower level of debt, profitability and risk with an added advantage 
of direct and readily access to capital market.  Bank affiliated firm capital structure 
determinants of growth, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shield and operating risk show 
significantly different association with choice of leverage compared to non-bank 
affiliated firms.  Group affiliated firms are determined to have implications of political 
and policy influence on their financing choice by removing market distortions, keeping 
others on a disadvantage.  Furthermore, bank affiliated group are found to have agency 
conflict between shareholders and management as well as conflit of interest between 
major and minority shareholders.      
Policy Implications  
The study provide empirical evidence about the market imperfections, and ability of 
larger groups to mitigate the effect of market distortions keeping their perosnal interests 
ahead of general public interest.  Policy makers are supposed to formulate and strengthen 
the regulatory system to mitigate the effect of such market imperfections. 
Limitations 
We had a limitation of limited firm year observations and time whereas, a more detailed 
time series analysis would have helped to understand the gravity of issue. 
Future Research  
There is need to further study this issue by incorporating the multiple leverage measures 
on the overall firm value.  Country wise cross sectional study with the similar regulatory 
environment would be novel addition to the literature.  Level of group-firm affiliation and 
regulatory developments over the years and its impact on firm leverage choice are of 
important empirical consideration. 
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